Mine Drills

I'm revising the draft of the history of Australian tank ops in Vietnam...field engineers feature stongly (as you'd expect).

I wonder if anyone could comment of the following scenario: a convoy moving along a road with an armoured escort, something suspicious seen on the road ahead....

There are two options, call the mini-team forward to check it out, or fire a burst of .30cal into it. The danger, of course, is that it could be a 'set up', a booby trap targeted at the mini-team.

If I think back to my training, I seem to recall that the SOP was not to fire into it, but to send the mini-team forward. (I believe that it may have been considered that shooting at 'it' may not have detonated the device, nor rendered it unsafe.)

Can anyone comment from their experience please?

(I'm trying to ensure that 'lessons learnt' are identified. Unfortunately, the situation I'm referring to was a 'set up'; resulting in a mini-team member being KIA.)

Many thanks, Bruce

Bruce, Firing ball MG ammo into an IED is unlikely to achieve anything unless it hit something like a prong on an M16 "Jumping Jack" mine. Typical mechanisms are push, pull, pressure, pressure release, electric, chemical reaction, friction and vibration. The chain of detonation usually requires some form of primer, possibly an intermediate charge and then the main charge of a low or high explosive type. In most instances attempting to burn a HE IED will be ineffective. Ball MG ammo usually could not successfully initiate the sequence but could actually make an IED unstable and more difficult to safely defuse, identify or dispose of. Explosive 20 lb, 25mm, 40mm GL, 76mm, 105mm or 120mm could detonate an IED but you would have minimum arming distance and grazing overshot safety issues. An M79 40mm HE GL "Wombat Gun" would pose the least risk if a direct hit was achieved. An M26 grenade has little explosive to set off an IED because it relies on case fragments for effect.



The current favoured IED inspection device is a robotic arm with camera fitted to the front corners of Bushmaster and MRAV types. The USMC has Remote Control mini vehicles that drive down LAV ramps. Thermal imagers in RWS and turrets might be able to discern threats better than with Vietnam surveillance technology. The qualified individual who has to identify and disarm a device should have a protection party and be shielded by direct fire and observation if practical. If not attach a grappling hook on a long tow rope and drag the suspect item away from your pathway being careful not to drive or walk near or over anything similarly suspicious. Everyone should be as low to the ground as is possible. Hope this helps.

Mr Chris Gardiner.

Hi Chris,

Thanks for info. What prompted my enquiry is the death of at least two sappers in two separate mini-team incidents. In both cases, anti-prodding devices were fitted to the mine or booby trap, eg. two sheets of flywire or alfoil separated by sheet of plastic, connected to the battery and detonator: bayonet pierces, circuit is made....

Eventually fibreglass prodders were introduced, but I'm trying to think how we might have done things better before then, other than just relying on the bravery of the mini-teams.

In hindsight, with the equipment available at the time, could a process have been followed which would have effectively countered anti-prodding devices (allowing the mini-team to 'safely' defuse the mine.

Many thanks, Bruce

Just a thought. The more recent remote controlled 'Wheelbarrow' which fired a shotgun round into a suspected terrorist bomb...I guess the thinking there is that the impact will cut any wires and render the device safe for defusing, if not actually detonating it. Given that a Centurion is in many ways a 53 tonne 'Wheelbarrow' could we have done the same thing with a canister round (all of this with the benefit of hindsight, of course).

Bruce

Many will appreciate that there's a bigger picture here....ie. how good was the Australian Army in responding to changes in enemy tactics, shortcomings on equipment, capitalising on capability advantages etc. I was in the UK during the Falklands War...we were briefed on action being taken as a result of realtime feedback in terms of everything from improvements to the tactics of siting Rapier, to overcoming deficiences identified in footwear.

Does the inability to immediately counter the anti-prodding device reveal a shortcoming in Operational Analysis (OA)? We introduce the fibreglass prodder...the enemy might then fit a pressure form of anti-prodding device, ie. no matter what form of prodder is used, the device is detonated...it seems to me that effective OA jumps ahead of the traditional incremental scenario.

Any comments appreciated, Bruce

Bruce, A metal detector operator working in partnership with the prodder should have detected the metal in the wire mesh before the electrical circuit was completed by the bayonet. The problem with metal detectors is that they are over sensitive and do not discriminate enough i.e. you get an aural warning far too often but no image to see what you are detecting. I suspect metal detectors will be replaced by ground penetrating RADARs as soon as the AESA type now in fighters become cheap and light enough to attach to an operator or robots arm. ESA RADARs use more efficient antenna EMF elements than metal detectors and conventional RADAR elements and their feed waveguides where most of the signal travels along the outside of the metalic skin. A plastic prod would have to be non static treated to guard against static electricity detonating the IEDs electric circuit. You do not prod from above deliberately because of the pressure device threat but hope to strike the case lower down at an angle first. Modern AP mines in particular have very little, if any, ferous metal in them to detect. Australia is now a signatory to the effect we cannot own, employ or lay mines for anything other than clearance training.
Mr Chris GARDINER.

I think this is about as far as I can go...

Scenario: The enemy watches and learns. He sees that whenever something supicious is seen ahead of an armoured group, two men dismount, go forward and prod around the object in order to uncover and disarm it.

This happens so frequently, the enemy decide to capitalise on what has become predictable. A hole is dug in the road after the armour goes past. It is lined with an anti-prodding device and the IED is placed in the centre. The enemy know the armour will be returning and ensure that the disturbance on the road will be seen.

As expected, the armour returns, the disturbance is seen, armour stops, two men go forward and one starts to prod. There is an explosion and he is killed.

The Lessons (in hindsight): The above happened in 1969...as a tank troop leader two years later, I knew nothing about this tactic. If a lead tank reported a disturbance on the road, I would send the mini-team forward.

QED. Our Operational Analysis, feedback and training were less than adequate. (Hopefully, the ADF's IED Task Force is tied into a realtime feedback, analysis, training loop today.)

If I'd know then, what I know now...I'd have tried even harder to be less predictable; if possible, using canister to expose the IED and counter command detonation/anti-prodding devices. (Obviously by-passing is nice, but not always feasible.)

As a footnote...I know of one use of tank fire to neutralise an IED: Binh Ba, inf reported a VC Claymore, it was neutralised with canister.

Bruce

I think I've finally found what it is that's been bugging me....it says it all at the top of the thread: 'Mine Drills'. We were taught a drill...something which was practised so frequently to that it could be repeated in exactly the same way, whenever the occasion might arise.

That is where the problem lies...repeat the procedure enough times and it becomes predictable...which the VC turned to their advantage.

I hope a 'mine drill' isn't being taught to AFV crews today. Anti-mine procedure yes, but drill, no.

Bruce